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I. INTRODUCTION
In Buckley v. Valeo, a 1976 challenge to the post-Watergate
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), the Supreme Court set
out a framework for evaluating campaign finance regulation that
has survived to the present day. The Buckley Court held that
campaign finance regulations trigger First Amendment scrutiny
because of the significant role that money plays as a tool of
communication in modern society.1 The Court then recognized
only one government interest important enough to justify
spending limits-preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption. 2 And, perhaps most significantly, the Court rejected
the argument that the government has any compelling interest in
* Jurisprudence Fellow, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law,
Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School, Director, Arthur Liman Public
Interest Program at Yale Law School. Many thanks to Burt Neuborne, Carol Lee,
and my colleagues at the Brennan Center for Justice for the conversations that
informed my thinking on this essay. I would also like to thank Professor Isabel
Medina and the Loyola Law Review for inviting me to participate in honoring Judge
J. Skelly Wright and his legacy. Lastly, I am indebted to Annie McBride, Will
Mizell, Justin Swaim, and the rest of the team for their editorial assistance.
1. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16-23 (1976) (per curiam).
2. Id. at 25-28.
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equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to
influence elections. 3
As a judge on the D.C. Circuit, J. Skelly Wright participated
in the drafting of the per curiam decision in Buckley upholding
FECA, the reasoning of which the Supreme Court ultimately
rejected. He was then one of the earliest and most persuasive
critics of that decision. Wright recognized that at stake in
Buckley were not just competing ideas about constitutional
meaning, but also competing understandings of how our
democracy works. More importantly, he focused on that question
as central, not peripheral, to the First Amendment analysis.
That insight-that our campaign finance jurisprudence plays an
important role in imagining and instantiating our democracyhas, for decades, received little explicit discussion in the Court's
case law. As a result, we live in a world in which the rules of the
game are set by people who purport to have no interest in how it
is played-and even less in its winners and losers. As Burt
Neuborne has explained, ours is "an accidental democracy, built
by judges."4
The Court has maintained this outward disinterest even as,
by many accounts, our democracy has gone off the rails. Turnout
levels are comparatively low in the highest profile presidential
races 5 and abysmal in most others.6 Public confidence in all
branches of government is at a historic low. 7
Political
polarization has produced sequential deadlocked Congresses.8

3. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam).
4. Burt Neuborne, Felix Frankfurter'sRevenge: An Accidental Democracy Built
by Judges, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 602, 662 (2011).
5. Voter
Turnout,
FAIR
VOTE,
http://www.fairvote.org/research-andanalysis/voter-turnout/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2014).
6. See Mike Maciag, Voter Turnout Plummeting in Local Elections, GOVERNING
(Oct. 2014), http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-voter-turnout-municipalelections.html (large city voter turnout averages approximately 21% for local
elections).
7. Justin McCarthy, Americans Losing Confidence in All Branches of U.S. Gov't,
GALLUP (June 30, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/171992/americans-losingconfidence-branches-gov.aspx.
8. See Amanda Terkel, 112h Congress Set to Become Most Unproductive Since
1940s, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/28/congressunproductive_n_2371387.html (last updated Dec. 28, 2012, 9:37 AM) (describing the
112th Congress); Susan Milligan, The Do-Nothing Congress, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Sept. 8, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/09/08/thedo-nothing-congress (describing the 113th Congress).
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And perhaps most significantly, new research indicates that the
preferences of most Americans have almost no influence on
federal policy; instead, our political system reflects the beliefs and
desires of the top one percent, or the "donor" class.9 Nonetheless,
this past term in McCutcheon v. FEC,10 the Roberts Court for the
seventh consecutive time considered and rejected a limit on
electoral spending as inconsistent with the First Amendment.1 1
The actual holding of McCutcheon was narrow; the aggregate
contribution limit, which capped the amount that any single
donor could give to federal candidates and parties at $123,200
during a single election cycle, was struck down.1 2 Still, the case
generated public outrage because it confirmed the Roberts Court's
commitment to using the First Amendment to block government
limits on electoral spending, even as the destructive consequences
of a system of elections financed disproportionately by wealthy
donors have become increasingly apparent.
McCutcheon has prompted calls for rethinking the
constitutional jurisprudence regulating money in politics, but the
question is how. Despite its unpopularity, the basic Buckley
structure has proven remarkably resilient, in part because there

9. See generally Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of
American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL.
564, 565 (2014) (concluding that "economic elites and organized groups representing
business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy,

while mass-based interest groups and average citizens have little or no independent
influence").
10. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
11. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (striking down Vermont's mandatory

campaign expenditure and contribution limits); Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546
U.S. 410 (2006) (striking down federal law regulating sham issue ads); Davis v. FEC,

554 U.S. 724 (2008) (invalidating the "Millionaire's Amendment" which had
permitted candidates facing wealthy self-funded opponents to raise larger
contributions until they achieved parity with their opponents); Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (permitting unions and corporations to make unlimited

independent election expenditures); Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (invalidating the triggered matching fund provisions
of Arizona's public finance system); Am. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct.
2490 (2012) (per curiam) (striking down a Montana ban on corporate political
spending); McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (invalidating the federal

aggregate contribution limits).

After McCutcheon, the few remaining campaign

finance regulations-the "soft money" ban, "pay to play" regulations, the base

contribution limits, and even public finance systems-are arguably at risk.
12. David Earley, In McCutcheon, Justices Advance Troubling Vision of
Democracy, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.brennancenter.o

rg/blog/mccutcheon-justices-advance-troubling-vision- democracy.
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is no consensus about how to replace it. 3 My goal in this brief
essay is not to propose a replacement for Buckley, but to suggest
that Judge Wright's early approach was the right one. Rather
than tinkering around the margins of an increasingly limited
doctrine, we should be talking explicitly about the purpose of
First Amendment rights in the context of the kind of democracy
we want to have.
I start therefore by outlining Wright's critique of the
democratic vision in Buckley. I then suggest that his key
insight-that arguments about campaign finance doctrine are
actually constitutive conversations about the shape of our
democracy-was lost in the years between Buckley and
McCutcheon, as the advocacy focused in on parsing definitions of
corruption. The results of this limited focus were twofold. First,
definitions of corruption proved slippery and malleable, easily
revised to suit the preferences of the reigning Court majority.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the public conversation
about campaign finance regulation became fixated on the role of
the First Amendment in monitoring government's failingsrather than articulating a positive role of these rights in enabling
and enhancing our project of self-government. These are the
conditions under which the Roberts Court was able to transform
the First Amendment into a deregulatory device that works to
disable government rather than build it.1 4 I conclude by arguing
that we should return to Wright's approach of connecting the
doctrine with its purpose, and I suggest that Justice Breyer's
dissent in McCutcheon is an important first step in that direction.
II. WRIGHT ON BUCKLEY
Judge Wright found nothing to compliment in the Supreme
Court's per curiam opinion in Buckley. In two articles written in
the early years after the decision, Wright criticized both the
Court's doctrinal and conceptual approach to the problem of
campaign finance reform. 15 Carol Lee's contribution to this

13. See Samuel Issacharoff, Response: Market Intermediariesin the Post-Buckley
World, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 105, 105-06 (2014), availableat http://www.nyulaw
review.org/sites/default/files/pdf/nyulawreviewonline-89-105-issacharoff.pdf.
14. See Johanna Kalb & Burt Neuborne, Introduction: Building a First
Amendment-Friendly Democracy or a Democracy-Friendly First Amendment?, 89
N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 10, 12 (2014), available at http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites
/default/files/pdf/nyulawreviewonline-89- 10-kalb-neuborne.pdf.
15. See J. Skelly Wright, Politicsand the Constitution:Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE
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collection discusses the judge's commitment to the core values of
equality and honest government and his disagreement with the
Court's rejection of the government's interest in promoting
political equality. 16 This essay focuses on his broader critique of
the Court's approach to its first campaign finance case.
Among the elements of FECA challenged in the Buckley case
were the limits placed on contributions to candidates, parties, and
political committees and on the amounts that candidates,
individuals, and organizations could spend to oppose or support a
person running for a federal office. The Court first explained that
because "virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's
mass society requires the expenditure of money,"'1 7 all limits on
political spending implicate the First Amendment.
But it
concluded that the level of burden varies with the type of
regulation. Expenditure limits "necessarily reducef the quantity
of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the
depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached."' 8
By contrast, contribution limits are less invasive because a
contribution "serves as a general expression of support for the
candidate and his views, but does not communicate the
underlying basis for the support."' 9 Thus, the Court determined
that expenditure limits can be upheld only if "the governmental
interests advanced ... satisfy the exacting scrutiny applicable to
limitations on core First Amendment rights of political
expression,"2 ° while contribution limits will survive if the state
demonstrates a "sufficiently important interest and employs
means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of
associational freedoms.'
Applying this constitutional framework, the Court held that
the government's compelling interest in fighting actual or
perceived corruption is sufficient to justify the limited First
Amendment intrusion of contribution limits. With respect to
L.J. 1001 (1976) [hereinafter Is Money Speech]; J. Skelly Wright, Money and the

Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 609, 645 (1982) [hereinafter Money and the Pollutionof Politics].
16. See Carol F. Lee, Judge J. Skelly Wright: Politics, Money and Equality, 61
Loy. L. REV. 93 (2015).
17. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 21.
20. Id. at 44-45.
21. Id. at 25.
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independent expenditures, however, the Court determined that
"[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination . . .with the
candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the
expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that
expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper
commitments from the candidate. 2 2 Thus, the Court concluded
that the expenditure limits were unconstitutional because they
"severely" restricted independent political speech, while doing
little to prevent political corruption. 23 The Court also squarely
rejected the government's alternative argument that it has a
compelling interest in promoting equality, explaining that "the
concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment. '24 This basic
framework for evaluating campaign finance regulation is
reflected in the state of the law today. Contribution limits are
constitutionally permissible if they serve the government's anticorruption objective, but independent expenditures cannot be
regulated because uncoordinated spending cannot corrupt.
In his early critique of Buckley, Wright suggested that
motivating the Court's decision was a powerful and problematic
view of the democratic process. According to Wright, the Court
implicitly adopted a democratic pluralist view 25 in which the
public good emerges "from the unregulated pursuit of private
In this model, the First
interests in the legislatures. 2 6
Amendment's function is primarily defensive. It works to protect
this unfettered interest group interaction from government
intervention so that "group pressure [can] run its course
unimpeded" and the public interest can emerge.2 7
Viewed through this lens, the doctrine of Buckley makes
sense. Government intervention can never be justified in efforts
to level the playing field because the public interest is itself
defined as what emerges from the battle of interest groups.
Moreover, far from being a threat to successful elections, political

22. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (per curiam).
23. Id. at 47.
24. Id. at 48-49.
25. See Is Money Speech, supra note 15, at 1015.
26. J.M. Balkin, Some Realism about Pluralism:Legal Realist Approaches to the
FirstAmendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 391.

27. See Is Money Speech, supra note 15, at 1016.
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spending is a central tool in the operation of this model of
As the Buckley plaintiffs argued, campaign
democracy.
contributions offer a way in which the intensity of political
28
commitment can be expressed and can influence the process.
There is competition among various viewpoints, and
candidates and others who want to see certain governmental
policies adopted roll up their sleeves and plunge into the
competition with all the resources at their command. The
prospect of large contributions may, for example, influence a
legislator to vote a particular way. Or sizeable media
expenditures may swing an important electoral race ....
Political spending is thus only problematic if it is evidence of
corruption-but defining corruption becomes itself a challenge,
given that using money to ensure policy outcomes is a legitimate
and important form of influence. Buckley imagines a point at
which government can regulate political contributions to prevent
"corruption," but draws no clear boundaries between permissible
demonstrations of "intensity" and impermissible "corruption."
Judge Wright's critique highlighted two problems with the
Buckley Court's model of democracy. The first is that it accepts
that rich and organized groups will have more influence over
politics-with the result that the will of the majority can be
legitimately ignored in favor of "a highly organized, narrowly
based group able to spend its money freely. 30° But the more basic
and significant problem, he explained, is that the Buckley Court's
understanding "drain[s] politics of its moral and intellectual
content."3 1 Citizens lose their agency and their values, and
politics becomes "a mere clash of forces, a battle of competing
intensities. '32 By contrast, he offered a view of our democracy as
a system of conscious and reflective self-government.
Self-governing people do not simply let the organized groups
of the day play out their battle of influence and then vote the
way of the prevailing forces .... They listen to all-the weak
and timid voice of the under-organized as well as the
sometimes bombastic, sometimes sophisticated, but always

28. Is Money Speech, supra note 15, at 1013.
29. Id. at 1014.

30. Id. at 1017.
31. Id. at 1018.
32. Id.
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elaborate communication of the affluent high-organized.
They do their best to filter out the decibels so that they may
And then they
penetrate to the merits of the arguments ....
33
choose the course which seems wisest.
Wright's political process is not a competition between
funded interest groups-it is "a battle of ideas, informed by
values-as the means by which the citizens apply their
intelligence to the making of hard public choices. 3 4 And his view
of the First Amendment, referencing Meiklejohn "protects not the
individual's desire for self-fulfillment but the collective thought
processes of the community."3 5 Political spending represents a
threat in this model because it distorts the marketplace of ideas
in favor of those with the most economic power.
As this account illustrates, Judge Wright's powerful insight
in Buckley was that campaign finance cases are decided based
upon some descriptive and normative understanding about how
democracy works-even if the Court never says the words. These
cases, in turn, help to generate our political reality. Perhaps
more significantly, Judge Wright viewed the First Amendment as
enabling government to improve upon the ideals of our
democracy-not as a barrier to government intervention to
prevent the worst excesses and abuses of the political system. He
suggested that the Court recognize that the government's interest
should be framed in terms of what our democracy could be, rather
than a cynical version of what it already is.
III. DEFINING CORRUPTION: FROM BUCKLEY TO
MCCUTCHEON
Wright's early attempt to bring a deliberative discussion
about the shape of democracy into campaign finance
jurisprudence failed to find much traction with the Court, in part
because for decades, the Buckley framework seemed malleable
enough to accommodate significant campaign finance reform.
Through the 1980s the Court's cases generally did not
present a challenge to the basic Buckley structure of allowing the

33. Is Money Speech, supra note 15, at 1018-19.
34. Id. at 1018.
35. Money and the Pollution of Politics, supra note 15, at 639 (citing A.
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 24-26, 65
(1948)).
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regulation of contributions, while rejecting limitations on
independent expenditures. Then in 1990, the Court decided
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, upholding a state
statute banning the use of corporate treasury funds for
independent expenditures. 3 6 The Court acknowledged that these
kinds of expenditures might not give rise to a significant danger
of quid pro quo corruption. Nonetheless, in an opinion written by
Justice Marshall, the Court found the statute constitutional
because it "aim[ed] at a different type of corruption in the
political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public's support for the corporation's political ideas. 3 7 Austin's
innovations were twofold. First, Austin put a dent into Buckley's
distinction between contributions (which could be regulated to
prevent quid pro quo corruption) and independent expenditures
(which could not) by allowing the regulation of independent
Second, Austin's "antiexpenditures by corporate entities.
distortion" rationale seemed to indicate the Court's willingness to
consider the political equality concerns it had squarely rejected in
Buckley.
The early 2000s then saw a series of four decisions in quick
succession, all of which upheld various limits on political
spending.3" Each of these decisions referenced or relied upon a
broad definition of "distortion" or "undue influence" corruption. 39
Of particular import was the Court's decision in McConnell v.
FEC, upholding the challenged provisions of the 2002 Bipartisan

36. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
37. Id. at 660.
38. FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93
(2003); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001); Nixon
v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
39. See Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 155-56 (following Colorado Republican to define
corruption to include "undue influence"); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 150 ("Our cases
have firmly established that Congress' legitimate interest extends beyond preventing
simple cash-for-votes corruption to curbing undue influence on an officeholder's
judgment, and the appearance of such influence." (internal quotation and citation
omitted)); Colo. Republican, 533 U.S. at 441 (corruption is not only "quid pro quo
agreements, but also . . . undue influence on an officeholder's judgment, and the
appearance of such influence" (citing Nixon, 528 U.S. at 388-89)); Nixon, 528 U.S. at

389 ("In speaking of 'improper influence' and 'opportunities for abuse' in addition to
'quid pro quo arrangements,' we [have] recognized a concern not confined to bribery

of public officials, but extending to the broader threat from politicians too compliant
with the wishes of large contributors.").
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Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). One of the BCRA's major reforms
was to prohibit national party committees from raising and
spending additional "soft money" funds-outside the federal
contribution limits-for issue advocacy or state races.40
Petitioners challenged that part of the BCRA on the grounds that
the record included no evidence of vote buying. 41 The Court
rejected that interpretation of the record 42 and noted that the
government's interest in preventing corruption was not "limited.
. . to the elimination of cash-for-votes exchanges," but rather
"extend[ed] to the broader threat from politicians too compliant
with the wishes of large contributors. 4 3 The Court concluded
from the record that "candidates and donors alike have in fact
exploited the soft-money loophole, the former to increase their
prospects of election and the latter to create debt on the part of
officeholders, with the national parties serving as willing
intermediaries. 4 4 Moreover, the Court explained that "[j]ust as
troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo
corruption is the danger that officeholders will decide issues not
on the merits or the desires of their constituencies, but according
to the wishes of those who have made large financial
'45
contributions valued by the officeholder.
Each of these decisions in the early 2000s was closely divided
and accompanied by an angry dissent. Nonetheless, by the
middle of the decade, the definition of corruption seemed broad
The
enough to accommodate significant reform regulation.
government could regulate not only to prevent the open exchange
of campaign cash for votes, but also to prevent candidates for
public office from being unduly influenced by their wealthiest
supporters at the expense of broader constituencies. The Buckley
framework for contributions and independent expenditures
remained in place, yet the division was porous enough that there
was no pressing need to rethink it. Then in the latter half of the
decade, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor were
replaced by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, and the
Court began to walk back from this expansive line of precedent to
narrow the government's ability to shape political spending in
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 142 (2003).
Id. at 149.
See id. at 150.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 146.
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 153.
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elections.
While the seeds of reversal appear even in the Roberts
Court's earlier decisions, its revised understanding of corruption
emerged most plainly in Citizens United v. FEC.4 6 In Citizens
United, the Court was asked to reconsider its holding in Austin
that corporations may be prevented from using general treasury
funds to engage in "independent expenditures."4 7 In overturning
Austin, the Court systematically rejected the line of cases offering
a more expansive understanding of the government's corruption
interest.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy first determined
that Austin's anti-distortion rationale was inconsistent with
Buckley's determination that the Government has no interest "in
equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to
influence the outcome of elections." The First Amendment's
protections, he explained, "do not depend on the speaker's
'financial ability to engage in public discussion. '"'48
Kennedy then proceeded to consider the government's
alternative argument that corporate political speech can be
regulated to prevent corruption or its appearance. Returning
again to Buckley, Kennedy asserted that the government interest
in corruption must be limited to preventing the quid pro quo
transaction, arguing that any broader definition of corruption
based on undue influence is inconsistent with the First
Amendment because "it is unbounded and susceptible to no
limiting principle. 49 Quoting his own dissenting opinion in
McConnell, Kennedy noted that

[flavoritism and influence are not

avoidable in
representative politics. It is in the nature of an elected
representative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary
corollary, to favor the voters and contributors who support
those policies. It is well understood that a substantial and
legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a vote for, or
to make a contribution to, one candidate over another is that
the candidate will respond by producing those political
.

.

.

46. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
47. Id. at 318-19.
48. Id. at 350 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (per curiam)).
49. Id. at 359 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 296 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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Democracy is premised on

Having limited the government's interest exclusively to
preventing the quid pro quo exchange, Kennedy then proceeded
to hold that the government's corruption interest can never
justify the regulation of independent expenditures. He reasoned
that since independent expenditures, by definition, are political
speech that is not coordinated with a candidate, they can never
provide the basis for an exchange of money for votes.5 1
The narrow definition of corruption offered in Citizens
United was solidified by last term's McCutcheon decision.
Writing for the plurality, Chief Justice Roberts began by
describing the Court's "past 40 years" of case law as standing for
the proposition that "government regulation may not target the
general gratitude a candidate may feel toward those who support
him or his allies, or the political access such support may
afford. 5 2 Quoting Citizens United, Roberts wrote that not only
are "[i]ngratiation and access.., not corruption," 53 they "embody
a central feature of democracy-that constituents support
candidates who share their beliefs and interests, and candidates
who are elected can be expected to be responsive to those
concerns." 54
Permissible government regulation, Roberts
explains, must target something much narrower. Quid pro quo
"captures the notion of a direct exchange of an official act for
money." 5
To allow broader regulation would "impermissibly
inject the Government into the debate over who should govern.
And those who govern should be the last people to help decide
56
who should govern."
Thus, in just over a decade, the act of buying political
influence went from providing a justification for government
regulation to being itself a constitutionally protected right. 57 The

50. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010) (quoting McConnell v. FEC,
540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
51. Id. at 360.
52. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014).
53. Id. (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1441-42 (internal quotation omitted).
57. See Chisun Lee, The Fatter the Wallet, the Louder the Voice, NATL L.J., May
5, 2014, at 26, available at http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/fatter-wallet-
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government's interest in campaign finance went from being
expansive enough to permit the regulation of undue influence to
being narrower than the existing laws on bribery. 8 Most of the
innovative campaign finance legislation of the last fifty years has
been undone, and the few remaining provisions are at risk.5 9
IV. TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC FIRST AMENDMENT
This very abbreviated history of the Court's jurisprudence
offers two lessons for campaign finance reformers. The first is
that today's First Amendment understanding need not carry the
day-a small change in Court personnel could have dramatic
impacts in this fluid area of constitutional doctrine. The second
and related observation is that framing the government's interest
in campaign finance regulation entirely around contested
definitions of corruption is unlikely to lead to a robust, and
ultimately decisive, prodemocracy understanding of the First
Amendment.
Corruption is a poor tool for the task for two reasons. First,
the line between corruption and the "rough and tumble" of
electoral politics is genuinely challenging to draw. Even among
reformers, there are heated debates as to whether and how
political spending can be appropriately limited. Second, framing
the government's interest solely in terms of its failures leaves no
space to articulate a positive role for the First Amendment in
enabling and enhancing our project of self-government. This

louder-voice.
58. See generally Zephyr Teachout, McCutcheon and the Meaning of Corruption:
Not All Quid Pro Quos are Made of the Same Stuff (Jan. 20, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript), availableat http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=238704
1.
59. See Paul Blumenthal, The Roberts Court Tees Up the End of Campaign
Finance Reform in its Latest Ruling, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 4, 2014, 7:36 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/04/john-roberts-campaignfinance-n_5086235.html
(explaining
how
McCutcheon undermines
the
constitutionality of the "soft money" ban); Devin Henry, Campaign Finance Lawsuits
in Minnesota and Other States Take Aim at ContributionLimits, MINNPOST (Apr. 21,
2014),
http://www.minnpost.comleffective-democracy/2014/04/campaign-financelawsuits-minnesota-and-other-states-take-aim-contributi
(describing
suit filed
challenging Minnesota limits on big-dollar donations from "special sources"); Richard
L. Hasen, Die Another Day: The Supreme Court Takes a Big Step Closer to Gutting
the Last Bits of Campaign Finance Reform, SLATE (Apr. 2, 2014, 1:13 PM),
http://wwwslate.comlarticles/news and politics/jurisprudence/2014/04/thesubtle_a
wfulness of the-mccutcheon_v_fec campaign finance_decisionthe.html (describing
the threat McCutcheon's reasoning poses to base contribution limits).
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constitutional vision is popular with the Court's conservatives
because it turns the First Amendment into a tool for disabling
government. ° But it leaves us having conversations about the
First Amendment's protections that are completely disconnected
from their history and purpose and thus are uninspired and
uninspiring. Our corruption experience suggests that Judge
Wright's approach was correct from the outset. To understand
the role of the First Amendment in regulating campaign finance,
we need to continually and openly reflect on how these rules
shape and impact our project of self-government.
The democracy lens helps make sense of the disconnect
between the plurality and dissent in McCutcheon. The justices in
the plurality are highly suspicious of any sort of government
intervention in the area of campaign finance regulation-and in
electoral politics more broadly."' They see the government as
oppositional to, not of, the people. 62 Thus, their First Amendment
is deeply individualistic, protecting each individual's right to
as much as he desires without regard to its
speak and spend
61
systemic effect.
The McCutcheon dissent, by contrast, represents an explicit
attempt to reconnect campaign finance doctrine back to a broader
understanding of our collective project of self-government.6 4 We
care about corruption, Justice Breyer says, not because it is a

60. See generally Kalb & Neuborne, supra note 14.

61. See id. at 13-14 (arguing that the McCutcheon opinion may indicate the Court
majority's intent to reduce the value of voting rights); see also Ellen D. Katz, Election
Law's Lochnerian Turn, 94 B.U. L. REV. 697, 698 (2014) (arguing that the Roberts
Court "sees a good deal of contemporary electoral regulation as impermissibly
redistributive and needlessly disruptive of the type of political participation that
would exist in its absence").
62. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441-42 (2014) ("Campaign finance
restrictions that pursue . . . objectives [other than fighting corruption], we have
explained, impermissibly inject the Government into the debate over who should
govern. And those who govern should be the last people to help decide who should
govern." (internal quotation omitted)).
63. See id. at 1448 ("The First Amendment 'is designed and intended to remove
governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as
to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, . . . in the belief
that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and
choice upon which our political systems rests."' (quoting Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 24 (1971)).
64. In so doing, Justice Breyer draws heavily on Robert Post's new historical
account of the First Amendment. See ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014).
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particularly bad kind of crime, but rather because it undermines
our faith in our representative government. For our democracy to
work, Americans need to believe that our government is
responsive to us. 6 5 When our elected officials are selected by and
dependent upon a handful of very rich people, the public loses
faith that our electoral process results in the selection of
representatives who are able and interested in listening to the
public will. 6 Regulations that build confidence in the integrity of
our electoral institutions do not contravene the First Amendment,
Breyer explains, but they help to realize its purpose, which is to
ensure all of us that we are an active and important part of our
own governance project.6 7
McCutcheon offers us two very different visions of how our
democracy could operate. In one, government is foreign and
suspect-best excluded entirely from a political process in which
each person participates according to his will and, more
significantly, his means. In other words, politics is a game with
no rules in which it's entirely acceptable that wealth wins. The
First Amendment is a deregulatory device that helps to protect
the free flow of political process from government.
In the other vision, which tracks closely to the D.C Circuit's
opinion in Buckley, our democracy is designed to engage and
serve all of the nation's people regardless of wealth. 8 Carefully
tailored rules are necessary to ensure not only that everyone can

65. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 ("The Framers ... require[ed] frequent
elections to federal office, and ... enact[ed] a First Amendment that would facilitate
a chain of communication between the people, and those, to whom they have

committed the exercise of the powers of government. This 'chain' would establish the
necessary communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments between the people
and their representatives, so that public opinion could be channeled into effective
governmental action." (internal quotations omitted)).
66. See id. ("Corruption breaks the constitutionally necessary 'chain of
communication' between the people and their representatives. It derails the
essential speech-to-government-action tie. Where enough money calls the tune, the
general public will not be heard. Insofar as corruption cuts the link between political
thought and political action, a free marketplace of political ideas loses its point.").
67. See id. ("[T]he First Amendment advances not only the individual's right to
engage in political speech, but also the public's interest in preserving a democratic
order in which collective speech matters.").
68. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("It would be strange
indeed if, by extrapolation outward from the basic rights of individuals, the wealthy
few could claim a constitutional guarantee to a stronger political voice than the
unwealthy many because they are able to give and spend more money, and because
the amounts they give and spend cannot be limited.").
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participate in our self-government, 69 but also that they can

realistically believe that their voices (and votes) matter. 70 The
First Amendment is designed to enable this outcome (not to block
it), so regulations that place some reasonable limits on individual
speech to advance our collective project of self-government are not
just consistent with the First Amendment, they are essential to
realizing its values. Or as Judge Wright said,
Nothing in the First Amendment prevents us . . . from
choosing ...to move closer to the kind of community process

that lies at the heart of the First Amendment conception-a
process wherein ideas and candidates prevail because of their
inherent worth, not because prestigious or wealthy people
line up in favor .. 71

This latter view might sound out of touch with the
challenging realities of American political life. Judge Wright too
was well aware that his view of the political process might be
"deeply unrealistic";7 ' but that, he argued, is part of the point.
Wright explained that "[a]lthough our political practice may often
fall woefully short, the First Amendment is founded on a certain
model of how self-governing people-both citizens and their
representatives-make their decisions," and this model "restores
considerations of justice and morality to the political process. '7
The First Amendment, as he explained it, is itself idealistic.74
69. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("What nourishes and
invigorates democracy is the root of widespread popular participation. No one can
doubt the compelling government interest in preserving the integrity of the system of
elections through which citizens exercise the core right of a free democracy of
selecting the officials who will make and execute the laws under which we all must
live.").
70. See id. at 841 ("The Constitution also takes account of the governmental
interest in curbing the appearance of undue influence, in order to avoid the corrosion
of public confidence that is indispensable to democratic survival.").
71. Is Money Speech, supra note 15, at 1005.
72. Id. at 1019.
73. Id. at 1018.
74. Id. at 1020-21 ("The Framers were not .. . cynically realistic when they
established our form of government. Had they been, we might not have had a First
Amendment. A government dedicated to liberty was more avisionary than a realistic
enterprise in those days .... But the Framers persevered."). In a later article, Judge
Wright considered the proposed rationales for the First Amendment and concluded
that none of them precluded restrictions on campaign contributions and
expenditures, and that the fundamental purpose of facilitating self-government
required such restrictions. See generally Money and the Pollution of Politics, supra
note 15. A new and important vein of campaign finance scholarship tries to imagine
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Framing the campaign finance conversation explicitly in
terms of the kind of democracy it creates helps to foreground the
real issues at stake in these cases. As Judge Wright wisely
observed, the fight is not over the line between influence and
bribery, it is about how we want to govern ourselves. The Roberts
Court's campaign finance jurisprudence (and its constricted
vision of the problem as limited to suitcases of cash) cements our
dysfunctional democracy in its current state, using the First
Amendment as a barrier to prevent attempts to rethink and
reshape our electoral processes and to create a more just and
equitable society. But there is another possibility (expressed first
by Judge Wright and now by Justice Breyer) in which campaign
finance cases (and the underlying legislation) are a site for
working out the relationship between wealth, opportunity, and
political equality in our society-and the First Amendment is
about reclaiming government, not rejecting it. In an age where
confidence in government is at record lows and where the voices
of everyday Americans have disappeared from our public policy,
Judge Wright's insight is even more urgent. We too should
approach these cases from this perspective-nothing less than
our democracy is at stake.

a more participatory democracy that resonates in the terms that Judge Wright and
Justice Breyer would recognize but that also tangles with the challenges of a political
system that in no way resembles the metaphorical "marketplace of ideas." See
Joseph Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken, The Two Trends that Matter for Party Politics,
89
N.Y.U.
L.
REV.
ONLINE
32
(2014),
available
at
http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/nyulawreviewonline-89-32fishkin-gerken.pdf; Kate Andrias, Hollowed-Out Democracy, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV.
ONLINE 48 (2014), available at http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/ny

ulawreviewonline-89-48-andrias0.pdf.

